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I. INTRODUCTION
“The world’s social media platforms and financial markets
are abuzz about cryptocurrencies ‘initial coin offerings’
(ICOs). There are tales of fortunes made and dreamed to be
made. We are hearing the familiar refrain, ‘this time is different.’”1
These are SEC Chairman Jay Clayton’s opening
remarks in his most recent2 Public Statement on the SEC
website regarding the phenomenon that is the Initial Coin
Offering market.3 By now, virtually everyone has heard of
cryptocurrency and Bitcoin. In fact, I would venture to say
that there is no hotter topic in the world; and, as of the time
of this writing, Bitcoin is trading at a ratio of around $10,863
USD/Bitcoin. (Notably, I expect this figure to change
drastically, for better and worse, and include it merely as a
time-capsule reminder to future readers of what was).4
Nevertheless, while all the world’s eyes watch Bitcoin, less
attention and scrutiny has been cast on the “spin-off” market

See generally Jay Clayton, Statement on Cryptocurrencies and Initial Coin
Offerings, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N (Dec. 11, 2011),
https://www.sec.gov/news/public-statement/statement-clayton-201712-11 [hereinafter Clayton].
2 As of Dec. 11, 2017.
3 Clayton, supra note 1.
4 See Cryptocurrency Market Capitalizations, COINMARKETCAP (Jan. 9,
2018), https://coinmarketcap.com/ [hereinafter Cryptocurrency Market
Capitalizations].
1
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for Alternate Coins (“Alt Coins”) and various “utility
tokens.” Nearly $4B5 was raised through Initial Coin
Offerings in 2017;6 representing a substantial increase from
the $294.9M that had been raised between 2014 and 2016.7
Moreover, only $39M8 of that $4B was raised within the first
three months of 2017, equating to $3.961B raised through
Initial Coin Offerings between April and the end of
December.9 Illustrated graphically, the trend looks as
follows:

10

Most interesting, however, is the staggering growth in
cryptocurrency market capitalization and, more specifically,
the money pumping through secondary markets for tokens:
the total cryptocurrency market capitalization recently

Matt Chwierut, A Framework for ICO/Token Sale Self-Governance, SMITH +
CROWN (Dec. 29, 2017), https://www.smithandcrown.com/frameworkico-token-sale-self-governance/.
6_CoinDesk,_CoinDesk_ICO_Tracker_(Nov._26,_2017),_https://www.coi
ndesk.com/ico-tracker/[hereinafter Coindesk].
7 Id.
8 Id.
9 Id.
10 Id.
5
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peaked at over $800B11 and the twenty-four-hour trade
volume in the cryptocurrency market recently surpassed
$50B, nearly the same daily volume as the New York Stock
Exchange.12
With that in mind, this note aims to clarify and
analyze the state of the token market, with the goal of
educating the legal community on certain core concepts to
help facilitate lively, progressive, and informed discussions.
While Section I preliminarily sets the scene, Section II further
addresses the current state of the market in order to provide
greater context and perspective and to define the legal
community’s role. Building upon Section II, Section III
explains the basics of blockchain, Bitcoin, Ethereum, smart
contracts, and the method of raising capital known as the
ICO. By explaining these concepts independently, I hope to
eradicate many of the misconceptions that may be created by
association. I feel that disassociation and proper
understanding is important because blind investing and the
conduct of a few bad players, in conjunction with a
misinformed media narrative, has the ability to put
unnecessary friction on a potentially meaningful and
disruptive movement. In this respect, I am not alone. My
concern has been echoed by other pundits and players in the
market. For example, at the International Monetary Fund’s
(“IMF”) Annual Meetings in Washington D.C.,13 IMF
Managing Director, Christine Lagarde, referred positively to

See generally Global Charts: Total Market Capitalization, CoinMarketCap,
https://coinmarketcap.com/charts/ (last visited Jan. 29, 2018).
12 Oscar Williams-Grut, The cryptocurrency market is now doing the same
daily volume as the New York Stock Exchange, BUS. INSIDER (Dec. 20, 2017),
http://www.businessinsider.com/daily-cryptocurrency-volumes-vsstock-market-volumes-2017-12.
13 Which took place in October 2017.
11
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the disruption set to take place, yet pulled back to state that
in looking forward, “. . .we should . . . be aware of not
categorizing anything that has to do with digital currencies
in those speculation, ponzi-like schemes [because] [i]t's a lot
more than that as well.”14 In my opinion, Largarde hinted
that as we progress through 2018 and beyond, she expects
many newly formed ICOs to fail, be exposed, or see their
tokens tremendously decline in price, thereby condemning,
by association, other companies with legitimate blockchain
businesses; other businesses that used ICOs appropriately to
fund legitimate projects; and the stable of mainstay
cryptocurrencies primarily used to purchase tokens
(whether through an ICO or on a secondary exchange).
After setting the scene and arming the reader with
sufficient knowledge to understand cryptocurrencies and
ICOs, Section IV of this note will then define some of the
more troubling problems in the market, including how
many companies are attempting to take advantage of grey
areas in the securities laws and how those actions interplay
with wildly speculative ICO pricing. Recently, Brad
Garlinghouse, CEO of Ripple (XRP), a company who wants
its platform to form the basis of cross-border exchange
between financial institutions, commented:
“[m]any of the ICOs are more frauds than real
businesses. The industry needs to work with
regulators and not be in the shadows . . . ICOs
are taking advantage of grey areas in securities

See generally Elizabeth Schulze, 'We are about to see massive disruptions':
IMF chief on digital currency future, CNBC (Oct. 13, 2017),
https://www.cnbc.com/2017/10/13/bitcoin-get-serious-about-digitalcurrency-imf-christine-lagarde-says.html.
14
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law. What worries me the most is some of the
hype in the system.”15
Ripple (XRP) usually trades as a top-5 cryptocurrency by
market cap16 and “Chris Larsen, the cofounder, executive
chairman, and former CEO, [briefly] became the world’s
fifth wealthiest person [when] the price of Ripple
soared past the $3 mark this January.”17
In light of some of the confounding securities issues
present in the market, Section V tracks and details the SEC’s
approach in taking jurisdiction over tokens, with the goal of
creating a baseline understanding of the factual context in
which a token in today’s market may be considered a
security or investment contract. After describing the SEC’s
approach, Section VI explains the most logical niche for ICOs
within the current securities framework, as well as details a
potential problem with squeezing more token sales into the
existing framework, before delving into approaches taken by
regulators in other countries.
II. THE CURRENT STATE OF THE MARKET
As alluded to, the coin market continues to heat up
from a campfire, to what looks like will be a full-fledged,
blue-flamed wildfire in 2018, as investors continue to seek
unfathomable returns from tokens that many know or, better

Paul R. La Monica, SEC Suspends Trading of Red-Hot Bitcoin Stock, CNN
MONEY (Dec. 19, 2017), money.cnn.com/2017/12/19/investing/bitcoincrytpocurrencies-sec-bubble/index.html.
16 Cryptocurrency Market Capitalizations, supra note 4.
17 Robert Hackett, Ripple's Cofounder Is Now One of the World's Richest
People, FORTUNE (Jan. 5, 2018), http://fortune.com/2018/01/04/rippleprice-google-bitcoin-cryptocurrency-rich/.
15
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yet, care to know, little to nothing about. While the narrative
of the legendary spike in Bitcoin price captured the attention
of anybody with a dollar to invest and a dream of one day
cruising a mega yacht from Monaco down the French
Riviera, the world, trying to catch the “next Bitcoin,” jumped
all over what can only be described as newly created crypto
lottery tickets, each believing/hoping that he or she will
become the next crypto millionaire. (Significantly, as this
note will illustrate, many of these “lottery tickets” have
nothing to do with Bitcoin, directly or in concept). “Coin
Mania,” as it can aptly be described, has thus driven
insanely speculative valuations when capital has been raised
through the issuance of tokens rather than through more
traditional forms of fundraising.18 This phenomenon, in
large part, is due to investors’ cognitive associations of the
terms “cryptocurrency” and “blockchain” to returns of
thousands of percentage points in a single year.19 To put this
in perspective, just look at the top-3020 tokens in terms of
return on investment since their ICO date:

See generally List of ICO’s Ranked by Return on Investment Since ICO Date,
ICO STATS, https://icostats.com/roi-since-ico (last visited Jan. 9, 2018)
[hereinafter List of ICO’s].
19 Id.
20 As of December 18, 2017.
18
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To emphasize, Jackson Palmer, developer of Dogecoin, a
coin he initially founded as a parody, but which has since
exploded to a $1 Billion market cap, stated:
The fact that most conversations happening in
the media and between peers focus on the
investment potential is worrying, as it draws
attention away from the underlying technology
and goals this movement was based [on] . . . .22
I have a lot of faith in the Dogecoin Core
development team to keep the software stable
and secure, but I think it says a lot about the
state of the cryptocurrency space in general

List of ICO’s supra note 18.
Wolfie Zhao, Dogecoin Market Cap Hits $1 Billion, to Its Creator's Dismay,
COINDESK, (Jan. 5, 2018,), https://www.coindesk.com/dogecoin-marketcap-hits-1-billion-creators-dismay/.
21
22
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that a currency with a dog on it which hasn’t
released a software update in over 2 years has
a $1B+ market cap.23
And, if that is not enough, a cryptokitty recently sold for
$114,481.59.24 There is just no doubt about it, in 2017, crypto
players quite literally made it rain . . . cats and dogs.
A. PUNDITS AND PLAYERS OPINE
Despite some of the substantial returns to date, many
legendary Wall Street Investors, economists, and financial
analysts are not buying into the hype, and popularly liken
this ICO boom to the Dot-Com bubble25 or Tulip Mania.26 In
the words of Howard Marks, famed, value investor and cochairman of Oaktree Capital who accurately forecasted the
Dot-Com bubble:
“In my view, digital currencies are nothing but
an unfounded fad (or perhaps even a pyramid
scheme), based on a willingness to ascribe
value to something that has little or none

Id.
Evelyn Cheng, Meet CryptoKitties, the $100,000 digital beanie babies
epitomizing the cryptocurrency mania, CNBC, (Dec. 6, 2017),
https://www.cnbc.com/2017/12/06/meet-cryptokitties-the-newdigital-beanie-babies-selling-for-100k.html.
25 See Jim Edwards, This is the tech bubble we have been waiting for, BUS.
INSIDER, (Nov. 21, 2017), www.businessinsider.com/cryptocurrency-icobubble-2017-11.
26 Howard Marks, There They Go Again . . . Again, OAKTREE CAPITAL
MGMT., L.P. (July 26, 2017), www.oaktreecapital.com/docs/defaultsource/memos/there-they-go-again-again.pdf [hereinafter Marks].
23
24
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beyond what people will pay for it. But this
isn’t the first time. The same description can be
applied to the Tulip [M]ania that peaked in
1637, the South Sea Bubble (1720) and the
Internet Bubble (1999-2000).”27
Many, like Marks28 (and in at least some respects, SEC
Chairman Jay Clayton, observing his cryptic “this time is
different”),29 believe, as Mark Twain once said, “[h]istory
doesn’t repeat itself, but it rhymes.”30
Nonetheless, I personally believe that a comparison to
Tulip Mania is unfair when speaking to the industry
generally because such a comparison disparages some of the
valuable, and disruptive ideas and technology associated
with the movement. Briefly consider blockchain (which will
be discussed later in detail). The use-cases for blockchain
technology range far and wide, and expand far beyond
digital currency. Imagine a world where art no longer
required a certificate of authenticity, where a deed to a
house no longer required title insurance, where someone
could go to the supermarket and look beyond a label and
into the true provenance of the food he or she purchases,31 a
world of transparent elections, self-auditing and verifying

Id.
Id.
29 Clayton, supra note 1.
30 Marks, supra note 26.
31
Alison DeNisco Rayome, IBM taps blockchain to combat food
contamination
in
global
supply
chain,
TechRepublic
(2017),
https://www.techrepublic.com/article/ibm-taps-blockchain-to-combatfood-contamination-in-global-supply-chain/ (last visited Jan. 29, 2018).
27
28
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accounting records,32 or where a smart-agent could
efficiently control a home’s energy expenditures, assess its
energy demands, and purchase electricity “in the most cost
effective markets to meet [the home’s] future demand.”33
All of this, and much more, can be made possible
through tailored applications of the blockchain; and,
most excitingly, the best ideas are yet to come.34
On the other hand, although I discourage
comparisons to Tulip Mania, comparisons to the Dot-Com
bubble feel more reasonable as a general statement. As
briefly touched on in the preceding, I believe blockchain
technology will play an integral role in facilitating various
trust-based processes across many industries including
finance, health-care, real estate, and supply-chain
management, to name a few. I also believe that blockchain
and cryptocurrencies (in some form) will survive as a major
sector or asset class, regardless of a bubble burst. Therefore,
while I tend to agree with Marks and Buffet35 that this may
“come to a bad ending”36 for many investors, I also believe
that we may see an “Amazon” or a “Microsoft” emerge from

See Accounting Tools For Tokens, Balanc3, https://www.balanc3.net/#/
(last visited Jan. 29, 2018).
33 E.g., Grid+, https://gridplus.io/ (last visited Jan. 29, 2018).
34 TechCrunch, Decentralizing Everything with Ethereum’s Vitalik Buterin,
YOUTUBE,_(Sept._18,_2017),_www.youtube.com/watch?v=WSN5BaCzsb
o&t=467s [hereinafter Decentralizing Everthing].
35 See generally Akin Oyedele, Warren Buffett says bitcoin ‘definitely will
come to a bad ending,’ BUSINESS INSIDER (Jan. 10, 2018),
http://www.businessinsider.com/warren-buffett-on-bitcoin-price-20181 [hereinafter Oyedele].
36 Id.
32
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this era (noting, that we are likely to see many more
“pets.com”).37
B. LEGAL AND REGULATORY CONCERNS
Whether Marks, Buffet, and other prominent skeptics
are correct in their respective assessments of Bitcoin and the
crypto industry generally is yet to be determined.
Nevertheless, due to the immense volume of money
pumping through the relatively newly formed ICO and
secondary token markets, “[a] number of concerns have been
raised regarding the cryptocurrency and ICO markets
including that, as they are currently operating, there is
substantially less investor protection than in our traditional
securities
markets
with
correspondingly
greater
38
opportunities for fraud and manipulation[.]” Crucially,
while an ICO sounds like a fundraising mechanism merely
for technologically-based, blockchain companies, in reality,
this practice has touched nearly every industry imaginable.39

See David Goldman, 10 Big dot.com Flops, CNNMoney, (Mar. 10, 2010),
http://money.cnn.com/galleries/2010/technology/1003/gallery.dot_co
m_busts/.
38 Clayton, supra note 1.
39 See Coindesk, supra note 6 (observing trend); see also List of ICO’s, supra
note 18.
37
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40

With that in mind, the rapid rise of Coin Mania has
made it difficult for a proper regulatory framework to
develop around tokens, both in the U.S. and abroad. Chiefly,
in the context of U.S. ICOs, the debate has boiled down to
whether, and under what circumstances, a utility token may
be considered a security or investment contract, thus
requiring compliance with the Securities Act of 1933. That
mentioned, “[a]s of December 11, 2017] no initial coin
offerings [had] been registered with the SEC.”41 Nonetheless,

See ICO Statistics - By Industry: Total USD Raised Per Category, WATCH
LIST, (Dec. 18, 2017), https://icowatchlist.com/statistics/categories.
41 Clayton, supra note 1.
40
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that is not to say that every, or even most, U.S. offerors have
not erred on the side of caution by structuring their offerings
as if selling a security or investment contract. Section 5 of the
Securities Act of 1933 requires registration of non-exempt
securities, and many ICOs have attempted to comply with
some transaction exemption, usually Rule 506, a “safe
harbor” under Section 4(a)(2) of the Securities Act, that
assures a company’s offering is within the Section 4(a)(2)
exemption by satisfying certain requirements.42
Filecoin, as an excellent example, appears to have
executed its $251M ICO as a Rule 506 offering. As such, the
Filecoin offering was effected via a ‘Simple Agreement for
Future Tokens’ (“SAFT”) and accompanying offering
memorandum,43 which limited the offering to accredited
investors, prohibited resales before the expiration of the
appropriate holding period, and detailed a lengthy list of
risk factors associated with investing in the Filecoin project
and blockchain technologies generally.44 These compliances
are particularly meaningful in combatting some of the more
prevalent issues and dangers present in today’s ICO and
secondary token markets (a thought that I will return to in
Section VI).

Fast Answers: Rule 506 of Regulation D, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N
(2017),_www.sec.gov/fast-answers/answers-rule506htm.html_(last
visited Feb. 2, 2018).
43 See generally Confidential Private Placement Offering Memorandum:
Purchase Rights for Tokens pursuant to Simple Agreement for Future Tokens,
PROTOCOL
LABS,
INC.
(last
visited
January
9,
2018),
https://coinlist.co/assets/index/filecoin_index/Protocol%20Labs%20%20SAFT%20-%20Private%20Placement%20Memorandumbbd65da01fdc4a15219c49ad20fb9e28681adec9fae744c41cccd124545c4c73.
pdf [hereinafter Protocol Labs, Inc.].
44 Id.
42
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C. THE LEGAL COMMUNITY’S ROLE
Noting the ambiguity in the law and the struggle of
global regulators to keep pace with cryptocurrencies and
newly enabled methods of raising capital, the worldwide
legal community, and not just those at the top, has a
responsibility to properly push forward on these highly
complicated issues to ensure the integrity of the financial
systems, the safety of citizens, and the proper promotion of a
transformative technology that may enable human progress
much like the introduction of the internet in the early 1990s.
As of today, many in the community have shied away from
addressing or discussing the complex legal issues
surrounding cryptocurrencies because they lack a
foundational understanding of the underlying technology
and core concepts that differentiate various use-cases.
In fact, I am hard-pressed to find people in the legal
community to discuss the topic in any detail beyond the
price of Bitcoin, Ethereum, or Litecoin.45As mentioned
earlier, blockchain technology appears influential, and other
ideas associated with cryptocurrencies may be equally as
powerful; yet, without widespread understanding,
blockchain technology and legitimate blockchain use-cases
face unwarranted reputational risks due, in large part, to
uneducated speculative investing and the potential for less

See Coinbase, https://www.coinbase.com/?locale=en-US (last visited
Jan 29, 2018) (Coinbase is a common entry-level wallet available for
download in the Apple App Store and for Android users, on Google
Play. In addition to recently added Bitcoin Cash, Coinbase permits the
purchase of Bitcoin, Ethereum, and Litecoin.).
45
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than informed policy decisions that may be made in
response.
III. CRYPTO 101
A. BLOCKCHAIN: BRIDGING THE TRUST GAP
The
fundamental
basis
for
understanding
cryptocurrencies and the cryptomarket generally, is a grasp
of the concept of blockchain. Currently, “blockchain is a
term widely used to represent an entire new suite of
technologies. [As such,] [t]here is substantial confusion
around its definition because the technology is early-stage,
and can be implemented in many ways depending on the
objective.”46 As described by IBM,
“[a] blockchain is a tamper-evident, shared
digital ledger that records transactions in a
public or private peer-to-peer network.
Distributed to all member nodes in the
network, the ledger permanently records, in a
sequential chain of cryptographic hashlinked blocks, the history of asset exchanges
that take place between the peers in the
network.”47

Zach Church, Blockchain, Explained, MI SLOAN SCH. OF MGMT., (May 25,
2017),_http://mitsloan.mit.edu/newsroom/articles/blockchainexplained/[hereinafter Church].
47 Sloane Brakeville & Bhargav Perepa, IBM Blockchain basics: Introduction
to distributed ledgers, INT’L BUS. MACH. CORP. (IBM) (Aug. 21, 2017),
https://www.ibm.com/developerworks/cloud/library/cl-blockchainbasics-intro-bluemix-trs/index.html [hereinafter Brakeville & Perepa].
46
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“All the confirmed and validated transaction
blocks are linked and chained from the
beginning of the chain to the most current
block, hence the name blockchain. The blockchain
thus acts as a single source of truth, and members
in a blockchain network can view only those
transactions that are relevant to them.”48
[emphasis added].
Broadly speaking, blockchain technology enables
direct peer-to-peer transactions and irreversible digital
record keeping through a distributed ledger system as
opposed to a centralized ledger system.49 Blockchain is peerto-peer because a transaction on the blockchain can occur
directly between those transacting, without a third-party
intermediary.50 Blockchain is irreversible because once a
block of transactions is verified, the underlying transactions
can never be modified.51 Blockchain is decentralized because
blockchain ledgers are maintained by each member node of
the ecosystem, as opposed to a single source.52
B. WHAT IS A “LEDGER?”
For anyone unfamiliar with the idea of a ledger, a
ledger is merely a record of some data.53 If each day Paul
recorded how many times he made his bed, then Paul would

Id.
Id.
50 Id.
51 Id.
52 Id.
53_General_Ledger, INVESTOPEDIA_(2014),_https://www.investopedia.com
/terms/g/generalledger.asp (last visited Feb. 1, 2018).
48
49
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be maintaining a ledger of how many nights he came home
with the potential for a great night’s sleep. As another
example, a typical small-business ledger may look
something like this:
54

C. Q: WHY A DECENTRALIZED LEDGER INSTEAD OF A
CENTRALIZED LEDGER? A: TRUST.
Where the blockchain becomes a bit more interesting
and novel, as the IBM comment notes, is in its creation of a
decentralized ledger system. Today, most ledgers are
centralized ledgers, and the fundamental distinction has
very important consequences.
Centralized ledgers are ledgers that are created,
controlled, and maintained by some central source. In the
business context, problems with centralized ledgers . . .
“stem from reliance on . . . trust-based, third-party systems,
such as financial institutions, clearinghouses, and other
mediators of existing institutional arrangements.” (emphasis
added).55 In short, economies operating on a system of
centralized ledgers are inherently slow, inefficient, costly,
non-transparent, and subject to fraud and misuse because
transactions in these systems usually rely on either blind
trust or some combination of verification (due diligence) and
insurance. As such, when centralized ledgers form the basis

54
55

Brakeville & Perepa, supra note 47.
Id.
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of an economy, transaction costs are high because “out-ofsync copies of business ledgers on each network
participant’s own systems [can] lead to faulty business
decisions made on temporary, incorrect data.”56
On the other hand, decentralized ledgers, also known
as distributed ledgers, are not created, controlled, and
maintained by a single, central source.57 Instead, via the
internet, decentralized ledgers are stored on many
computers (“nodes”) owned by participants in the
network.58 In an economic system composed of
decentralized ledgers, “[i]nstead of relying on a third party,
such as a financial institution, to mediate transactions,
member nodes in a blockchain network use a consensus
protocol to agree on ledger content, and cryptographic hashes
and digital signatures to ensure the integrity of
transactions.”59 For non-technical discussion, the most
important of these key terms is consensus.
D. WHAT IS “CONSENSUS?”
Consensus ensures that “shared ledgers are exact
copies, and lowers the risk of fraudulent transactions,
because tampering would have to occur across many places
at exactly the same time.”60 To illustrate this concept,
contemplate an example. Imagine there is a magical book,
and anybody who wished to obtain a copy of the book
merely had to snap their fingers. This book has no single

Id.
Id.
58 JOSIAS N. DEWEY ET AL., THE BLOCKCHAIN: A GUIDE FOR LEGAL
PROFESSIONALS, 3 (2017).
59 Brakeville & Perepa, supra note 47.
60 Id.
56
57
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author, but instead relies on the community of book owners
to add lines of text to the story. Once a line of text is added
by one author, that line appears in all of the other copies of
the magical book. But, as with all magical items, there is a
catch: all lines are permanent and the magical books make
sure of it. By comparing texts every few seconds, the magical
books come to a consensus on a true copy (the true copy
being the copy that the majority of the books hold as record).
As such, if someone attempted to erase a single, regrettable
line from his or her own copy, the books would simply
notice the discrepancy in that copy and place the original
line right back underneath his or her eraser marks.61
Understanding the book example simplifies the
concept behind consensus. Long story short, decentralized
ledgers bridge the trust gap inherent in centralized ledger
systems, thereby potentially reducing transaction costs. Said
differently,
“[b]ecause
the
blockchain
verifies
trustworthiness, you don’t have to. And the friction of the
transaction is reduced, resulting in cost and time savings.”62
E. WHAT’S IN A NAME? BLOCKCHAIN.
block + chain = blockchain.
For this explanation, assume that the blockchain we are
describing is used as the underlying technology to facilitate the use
of a digital currency. Therefore, transactions in the currency are

See generally TEDx Talks, The Value Revolution: How Blockchain Will
Change
Money
&
the
World,
YOUTUBE
(Apr.
3,
2017),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ft8dSvdH2ek (mimicking Galia
Benartzi’s analogy beginning at time 3:59).
62 Church, supra note 46.
61
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the “data” being recorded on this blockchain. However, while
reading this example, note that many other forms of data may be
recorded using the same technology.
A “block” is simply a convenient way to aggregate
transactions into larger groups for processing purposes.
“The transactions bundled up and included in a block do not
necessarily have any relationship with each other (just as a
batch of checks being processed by a bank may have no
relationship to each other), other than a temporal
relationship (i.e., they are all recent transactions not included
in a prior block).”63 In this scenario, a block might include a
record of Jim paying Cynthia 10 “cryptos” in America, Dan
in Norway paying 7 cryptos to Sergio in France, and Warren
buying something online for 20 cryptos, as well as a couple
other thousand transactions that may have taken place
across the globe. Before moving forward, consider what each
of the three listed pairs of payments really communicates. To
do so, start by imagining the ledger containing each person’s
account balance. Next, imagine what each transaction is
really telling the broader network. To help you visualize,
these steps have been illustrated below:

63

Jim

“Reduce my account by an amount of 10 cryptos and
increase Cynthia’s account by an amount of 10 cryptos.”

Dan

“Reduce my account by an amount of 7 cryptos and
increase Sergio’s account by an amount of 7 cryptos.”

Warren

“Reduce my account by an amount of 20 cryptos and
increase Online Vendor’s account by an amount of 20
cryptos.”

DEWEY ET AL., supra note 58, at 5.
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Jim
Cynthia
Dan
Sergio
Warren
Vendor

1,000.00
10,000.00
500.00
1,200.00
8,300.00
1,000,000.00

Jim
Cynthia
Dan
Sergio
Warren
Vendor

V. 25
990.00
10,010.00
493.00
1,207.00
8,280.00
1,000,020.00

Importantly, on the blockchain, account balances are
not actually held like in the example above. Instead, on the
blockchain, funds are verified by reference links to previous
transactions in the network, all of which have been
permanently recorded on the general comprehensive ledgers
maintained by the member nodes. So, for Jim to send
Cynthia 10 cryptos, there must be some reference
transactions (“inputs”) to Jim, at some point, having
received at least 10 cryptos (which, he has not already
spent). In this case, referring back to our pretend ledger, we
know that Jim has transaction references that indicate he
may transfer up to 1,000 cryptos (total amount Jim can
transfer = [Jim’s inputs] – [Jim’s outputs]). Thus, through
these reference links, ownership of cryptos is verified against
and passed along blocks in a chain, ensuring that the validity
of each transaction is entirely, mathematically contingent
upon the history of all previous transactions in the network
and that no coin can be spent twice.64
F. SUZY LEMONADE: CONCEPTS APPLIED.
The following is a simplified example of how a transaction
would differ in an ecosystem of centralized ledgers versus an

CuriousInventor, How Bitcoin Works Under The Hood, YOUTUBE (July 14,
2013), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Lx9zgZCMqXE.
64
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ecosystem of decentralized ledgers run on blockchain. Although
simplistic, I believe this example suffices for the purposes of
grappling with legal concepts from a regulatory and policy
perspective.
1. SUZY LEMONADE: CENTRALIZED LEDGER
Suzy, a sophisticated and entrepreneurial 6-year-old,
runs a lemonade stand. To properly run her business, Suzy
maintains a ledger that shows how many lemons she has at
the start of the day, how many lemonades she sells (and at
what price), and how many lemons she has at the end of the
day. As Suzy continues to run her business, she continually
updates her ledger to reflect her daily operations. In this
example, Suzy is maintaining a centralized ledger because
Suzy is the only one who updates and has access to the
ledger.
Enter Luke, Suzy’s neighbor who acquired a small
child’s fortune selling cookies during recess and now wishes
to acquire a complementary business to expand his empire.
Luke is extremely interested in Suzy’s lemonade stand as a
potential acquisition; with his cookies and Suzy’s secret
lemonade recipe, Luke could gobble up the entire market for
playground snacks. As any right-minded 6-year-old would
do, Luke contacts Suzy, and asks for a copy of her ledger in
order to determine a fair price. Suzy, looking to make
enough money so she can launch her next venture, fudges
the numbers to reflect selling more lemonade, making her
lemonade stand more appealing to Luke. Unfortunately,
Luke trusts Suzy and also has no way of verifying the
record’s authenticity. As such, Luke accepts the record as
true and unfortunately overpays for Suzy’s business.
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2. SUZY LEMONADE: DECENTRALIZED LEDGER RUN ON
BLOCKCHAIN

Reimagine the prior scenario, but in a decentralized
ecosystem run on the blockchain. If Suzy operated her
business using a decentralized ledger system run on
blockchain, Suzy’s operations and, consequently, the
transaction would look quite different. In this world, each of
Suzy’s customers may have access to a pseudo-anonymous
public record that continuously updates to show Suzy’s sales
in addition to a private record of his or her own transaction
history with Suzy. Moreover, instead of recording the sales
inputs herself, each time Suzy sold lemonade, for example,
the sale would automatically be recorded, verified, and
sealed.
Now again, enter Luke. Luke contacts Suzy to acquire
her business. However, this time, rather than relying on
Suzy’s record, Luke can rely on a sealed, public ledger made
available through the blockchain. Suzy can no longer
manipulate her record because the distributed ledgers on the
blockchain all communicate with one another in order to
verify that each is an exact identical copy; or said otherwise,
that there is consensus amongst all copies of the ledger.
Therefore, even if Suzy somehow managed to change
some numbers, within a few seconds, the ledgers would
notice a discrepancy in Suzy’s copy, and automatically
correct it to reflect the original record maintained by every
other ledger in the system. Because there is a decentralized
ledger system run on blockchain, Luke no longer has to rely on his
trust in Suzy. Instead, Luke has a system in place that ensures that
the ledger can be trusted.
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3. IS BLOCKCHAIN A PERFECT SYSTEM?
“. . . [P]ick any industry, and [blockchain] technology
holds huge potential to disrupt it, creating a more prosperous
world where people [can] participate in the value that they
create.”65 However, blockchain is far from a perfect system
and the technology is still very early stage. Currently, the
technology provides “us new opportunities to rethink how
parts of our society work,”66 particularly as we progress
through our vision of an Internet of Things, when a
blockchain settlement system may be necessary to “settle
trillions of real-time transactions”67 that banks may not be
able to handle. That said, for now, the Suzy Lemonade
example is more utopian than practical. As of today,
blockchain seems to be a promising technology for
maintaining data integrity over some records: for example,
for physical supply-chains, blockchain may help prevent
someone from fraudulently acquiring record ownership of
an asset.
Nevertheless, the direction of blockchain is far from
certain, and the effectiveness and rate of adoption will likely
depend on the adoption of many new technologies across
many industries; a process that will take some time.
Moreover, although much of the preceding discussed cutting

Don Tapscott, How Blockchains could Change the World, MCKINSEY &
COMPANY
(2016),
https://www.mckinsey.com/industries/hightech/our-insights/how-blockchains-could-change-the-world (last visited
Feb. 2, 2018) [hereinafter Tapscott].
66 Mark Staples, Blockchain is useful for a lot more than just Bitcoin, THE
CONVERSATION
(2016),
https://theconversation.com/blockchain-isuseful-for-a-lot-more-than-just-bitcoin-58921 (last visited Feb. 2, 2018)
[hereinafter Staples].
67 Tapscott, supra note 65.
65
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out middlemen and third-parties, one could also easily “. . .
imagine the adoption of blockchain technologies creating
opportunities for new kinds of trusted third-party
organisations.”68 Take Everledger, a company that uses a
blockchain to record information about the provenance and
ownership of individual diamonds and other valuables.
“Everledger relies on major diamond certification companies
to measure identifying information about individual
diamonds.”69 While “[t]hese measurements can be
independently cross-checked,”70 companies such as
Everledger essentially become “trusted third-parties for
blockchain-based systems.”71 Therefore, when speaking to
blockchain, my view mirrors Don Tapscott’s, who once said,
“I’m not a futurist. I think the future’s not something to be
predicted—it’s something to be achieved. What we’re arguing
is that this technology is revolutionary and holds vast potential
to change society.”72
G. THE (CURRENT) MAJOR LEAGUE COINS
1. BITCOIN
“[Blockchain] is to Bitcoin, what the internet is to email. A big
electronic system, on top of which you can build applications.
Currency is just one.”73

Staples, supra note 66.
Id.
70 Id.
71 Id.
72 Tapscott, supra note 65.
73 Sally Davies, How bitcoin and its blockchain work, FINANCIAL TIMES
(2015),
https://www.ft.com/video/2be94381-66dc-3320-a2926a1cde0a3d5f (last visited Jan 29, 2018) (emphasis added).
68
69
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Bitcoin (“BTC”) is simply one blockchain use-case, of
which there are many. Bitcoin was first introduced to the
world in 2008 when an anonymous person (or group of
people) named Satoshi Nakomoto published a nine-page
document titled “Bitcoin: A peer-to-peer electronic cash
system,”74 which described the world’s first completely
decentralized digital currency. The idea behind Bitcoin,
which many speculate arose in response to the financial
crisis of 2007-2008, was to create a more secure and reliable
global currency that operated peer-to-peer, under no central
authority, and outside of the central banking system. Unlike
fiat currency, no institution or group can expand or contract
the Bitcoin money supply. Instead, mathematics determines
when a new Bitcoin will be released. That mentioned, the
Bitcoin algorithm permits only 21 million Bitcoin to ever
come into existence; approximately 16.8 million of which are
currently in circulation today.75 Given the efficiencies of
distributed ledger technology, that the currency survives
with no single source of failure, that the currency has a finite
supply, and that the network operates globally, peer-to-peer,
Bitcoin became an intriguing option as a compliment or
alternative to other, more traditional currencies, particularly
for citizens in countries with historically unstable currencies
and crippling financial regulations.
With that in mind, by 2009, Bitcoin was available to
the public, and by 2010, Bitcoin received its first “valuation”
when a man in Florida exchanged 10,000 BTC for two

See generally Satoshi Nakamoto, Bitcoin: A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash
System (Oct. 2008), https://bitcoin.org/bitcoin.pdf.
75
Bitcoins
in
circulation, BLOCKCHAIN
LUXENBOURG,
https://blockchain.info/charts/total-bitcoins (last visited Jan. 7, 2018).
74
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delivered Papa John’s pizzas (talk about margins!).76 While
the idea for a peer-to-peer digital currency, or internet
money, had floated around for some years, one problem
always loomed large. Until Bitcoin, online transactions
required a trusted third-party intermediary because of the
potential for double spending. Borrowing an example, the
double spending problem Bitcoin solved can be summarized
as follows (this should help put the prior discussion on
blockchain and ledgers into context):
“[prior to Bitcoin] if Alice wanted to send $100
to Bob over the Internet, she would have had
to rely on a third-party service like PayPal or
MasterCard. Intermediaries like PayPal keep a
ledger of account holders’ balances. When
Alice sends Bob $100, PayPal deducts the
amount from her account and adds it to Bob’s
account. Without such intermediaries, digital
money could be spent twice. Imagine there are
no intermediaries with ledgers, and digital
cash is simply a computer file, just as digital
documents are computer files. Alice could send
$100 to Bob by attaching a money file to a
message. But just as with email, sending an
attachment does not remove it from one’s
computer. Alice would retain a copy of the

Aaron Hankin, Bitcoin Pizza Day: Celebrating the $20 Million Pizza Order,
INVESTOPEDIA
(May
22,
2017),
https://www.investopedia.com/news/bitcoin-pizza-day-celebrating20-million-pizza-order/(last visited Jan. 29, 2018).
76
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money file after she had sent it. She could then
easily send the same $100 to Charlie.”77
Bitcoin solved this double spending problem using
blockchain and public and private key cryptography. The
following describes how Bitcoin solved double-spend:
“When Alice decides to transfer bitcoins to
Bob, she creates a message, called a
‘transaction,’ which contains Bob’s public key,
and she ‘signs’ it with her private key. By
looking at Alice’s public key, anyone can verify
that the transaction was indeed signed with
her private key, that it is an authentic
exchange, and that Bob is the new owner of the
funds. The transaction—and thus the transfer
of ownership of the bitcoins—is recorded,
time-stamped, and displayed in one ‘block’ of
the block chain. Public-key cryptography
ensures that all computers in the network have
a constantly updated and verified record of all
transactions within the Bitcoin network, which
prevents double-spending and fraud.”78
And yes, by now you have probably guessed, the verifying
anyone referred to above is the world-renown community of
Bitcoin miners, who are rewarded with Bitcoin for
contributing computer power to help run the network by

JERRY BRITO & ANDREA CASTILLO, BITCOIN A PRIMER FOR POLICYMAKERS,
Mercatus
Ctr.
George
Mason
University
(2013),
https://www.mercatus.org/system/files/Brito_BitcoinPrimer.pdf.
78 Id.
77
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authenticating transactions. In this sense, Bitcoin miners can
be viewed as Bitcoin auditors who ensure that no Bitcoin is
spent twice and that all transactions are true and accurate.
2. ETHEREUM
Around 2013, some people began to realize that
blockchains could be used for much more than just peer-topeer digital currencies like Bitcoin. One of the most capable
and interested of these people was an ambitious teenager, 19
year-old, Vitalik Buterin. While Buterin realized a vast
potential for blockchain use-cases, he also understood that it
was impossible to predict all possible blockchain
applications.79 With that wisdom, Buterin, rather than
building a specific application, instead decided to build a
public blockchain, Ethereum. As described on the Ethereum
website, Ethereum is a “decentralized platform that runs
smart contracts: applications that run exactly as
programmed without any possibility of downtime,
censorship, or third-party interference,”80 enabling
“developers to create markets, store registries of debts or
promises, move funds in accordance with instructions given
long in the past (like a will or a futures contract) and many
other things that have not been invented yet, all without a
middleman or counterparty risk.”81
As Vitalik describes it, Ethereum operates very
similarly to how we create and run applications on our
smart phones (except that Ethereum has its own native

See generally Decentralizing Everything, supra footnote 34.
See generally Ethereum Project, https://www.ethereum.org/ (last
visited Feb. 2, 2018) [hereinafter Ethereum Project].
81 Id.
79
80
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currency).82 Most of our phones run on one of two mobile
operating systems, iOS (developed by Apple) or Android
(developed by Google).83 As we are likely all aware,
anybody can create, download, or run an app on iOS or
Android. In this analogy, iOS or Android can be likened to
the Ethereum blockchain because the Ethereum blockchain
serves as a flexible, all-purpose blockchain for anybody that
wishes to create or run a decentralized application or smart
contract.84 In addition to many other applications, Ethereum
even allows users to create their own tradeable digital token
or currency.85
H. WHAT IS A “SMART CONTRACT?”
A smart contract is a computer program that controls
a digital asset.86 In essence, smart contracts help exchange
data, money, property, shares, or anything of value without
the need for a third-party intermediary. According to Nick
Szabo, the computer scientist credited with coining the term
“smart contract,” the “primitive ancestor” of smart contracts

See Decentralizing Everything, supra note 34 (analogy starting at 4:10).
See
Mobile
OS
market
share
2017, Statista,
https://www.statista.com/statistics/266136/global-market-share-heldby-smartphone-operating-systems/ (last visited Feb. 1, 2018); see also
Laurence Goasduff & Amy Ann Forni, Gartner Says Worldwide Sales of
Smartphones Grew 7 Percent in the Fourth Quarter of 2016, Gartner
(2017), https://www.gartner.com/newsroom/id/3609817 (last visited
Feb. 1, 2018) (noting Android and iOS accounted for 99.6 percent of all
smartphone sales in the fourth quarter of 2016).
84 Decentralizing Everything, supra note 34 (analogy starting at 4:10).
85 Ethereum Project, supra note 80.
86 See Decentralizing Everything, supra note 34 (starting at 6:35).
82
83
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is the . . . vending machine.87 Szabo’s logic asserted that a
vending machine represented a contract embedded in a
piece of hardware that provided ample security for the
“profitable deployment of vending machines in a wide
variety of areas.”88 With respect to a vending machine, the
terms of the contract are simple. Assume a vending machine
charges $1.50 for a Coke. The terms of the contract are such
that:
1) if you put in $1.50, you will receive a Coke.
2) if you put in more than $1.50, you will
receive a Coke and change (the difference
between the amount you put in and $1.50).
3) if you do not put in $1.50, you will not
receive a Coke, unless you are willing to break
the machine (and take the risk of bypassing the
security) or unless the machine malfunctions,
providing you with a free Coke.89
While the vending machine proved to be secure
enough to serve as a profitable platform for the asset
exchange of sodas, creating a secure mechanism for the
transfer of more valuable digital assets with much more
complex contractual clauses required an immensely greater
level of sophistication and security. Accordingly, Buterin
and others in the community realized that providing a safe
and secure ecosystem to house these transactions is the key

See generally Nick Szabo, The Idea of Smart Contracts, (1997),
http://www.fon.hum.uva.nl/rob/Courses/InformationInSpeech/CDR
OM/Literature/LOTwinterschool2006/szabo.best.vwh.net/idea.html.
88 Id.
89 See Decentralizing Everything, supra note 34 (analogy starting at 6:35).
87
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to implementing smart contracts on a greater scale.90
Currently, in the “world of cryptography” as Buterin
explains, “. . . even individuals are capable of having . . .
cryptographic defenses that are strong enough to . . .
sometimes ward off state level actors.”91 Hence, as
cryptography continues to progress, a greater array of smart
contract transactions will likely become available. 92
I. INITIAL COIN OFFERING (ICO)
“An ICO is a fundraising event, effected using
distributed ledger technology, in which a ‘token’ or
‘coin’ is offered to a participant in return for either
cash (fiat currency) or cryptocurrency, such as
Ether or Bitcoin. A token entitles its holders to
various rights, which typically include the right to
use a service to be developed and offered by the
issuer. The proceeds of the token sale are used to
fund a venture or a project undertaken by the ICO
sponsors.
Similar to equity securities, however, tokens sold in
ICOs may also confer profit rights, may appreciate
in value, and can be traded. ICO tokens do not
represent an ownership interest in a venture.”93
(emphasis added).

Id.
Id at 7:10.
92 Id.
93 Steve Gatti, Megan Gordon & Daniel Silver, SEC Enforcement Against
Initial Coin Offering, CLIFFORD CHANCE LLP (Oct. 2017) [hereinafter Gatti,
Gordon & Silver].
90
91
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By now, I am ready to make the big reveal, the secret to
understanding this concept is pizza!
The year is 2017. The place is San Jose, California. The
brain trust behind a company known as Duck E. Cheese just
had a brilliant idea to create an establishment that
serves pizza and other menu items, complemented
by arcade,_games, amusement_rides,_and animatronic displ
ays as a focus of entertainment for the entire family.
Revolutionary! But, the group has one problem, it has no
money to lease a space, buy the arcade games, or hire a chef
to come up with a proprietary secret recipe for pizza. The
group needed some investors. Luckily, Jeff, the group
behavioral economist (and, the cleverest of them all) comes
up with an idea. “Hey guys,” Jeff said, “remember that
token thing I mentioned? How everything inside of our
establishment would be priced and paid for in Duck E.
Cheese money? You know, that customers could acquire
using, and exchange for, real dollars?” Naturally, the group
looked confused, they needed money to fund the project,
and all Jeff could talk about was his funny money. “Well,”
said Jeff, “what if we make every Duck E. Cheese token
worth 25 cents right now, and sell them to some future
customers in order to get our project started.”
Immediately, Dan interjects, “who would want tokens
to a place that doesn’t even exist yet? And what makes them
worth 25 cents anyway?” “Dan, you’re missing the point,”
Jeff replied, “if we issued only a limited supply, and these
were the only tokens that Duck E. Cheese would accept to
use our facilities, and Duck E. Cheese became a huge hit that
everybody wanted to bring their kids to, we could sell these
same coins for 50 cents one day, or a dollar, or more, who
knows!” “So, it would be a discount to future customers”
Brian interjected. “Well, you could say that, or maybe if
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Duck E. Cheese is a huge success, and how could it not be,
our customers could sell the token that they acquired to
other customers who want to come and enjoy the fun,
games, and Pizza at Duck E. Cheese, at a huge profit! You
know that whole supply and demand thing.” The group
markets their “utility tokens” (tokens that can be utilized to
play games and buy pizza at Duck E. Cheese) promising that
Duck E. Cheese will disrupt the entertainment industry.
Bewildered by such a fascinating entertainment concept,
people all around the world who hear about the Duck E.
Cheese offering fight ruthlessly to get their hands on tokens
to ‘hodl,”94 hoping that once Duck E. Cheese becomes a
global franchise, the value of the tokens will go “to the
moon!”95 The tokens sell out in record time, and the group
raises $10M for a project that is really nothing more than an
idea.
Now imagine this same scenario, but instead, Duck E.
Cheese had already set up their first location. How about
their first 100? Through life experience, we know (or at least
we think we know) that we are not buying securities or
investment contracts96 when purchasing credits at a place
like Dave & Busters, gift cards at Starbucks, or tokens at the

The term “hodl” rose to fame when someone on a Bitcoin Forum
message board misspelled hold. Hodl has since become a slang term
used in the crypto community to describe holding onto a coin rather than
selling it. Given that cryptocurrency has proven to be extremely volatile,
the term is now frequently used as a humorous backronym for the
phrase “hold on for dear life.”
95 “To the moon” is a phrase often used in the crypto community to
describe an astronomically dramatic increase, or hope for such an
increase, in the price of a token.
96 See generally S.E.C. v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293 (1946) (defining
“investment contract”) [hereinafter Howey].
94
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local arcade. In these familiar transactions, we do not expect
to hold onto these credits or tokens, thinking one day they
may be more valuable. To the contrary, we are usually in a
rush to spend them. Moreover, there is generally no
secondary market of exchange for these tokens. As such, if
we have leftover credits, we usually save our cards or tokens
for another day. Nevertheless, the aforementioned Duck E.
Cheese offering essentially offered tokens with similar
characteristics, yet the public perception for some reason felt
different. In fact, acquirers had very different expectations
when buying the Duck E. Cheese tokens as opposed to when
purchasing credits at Dave & Busters, gift cards at Starbucks,
or tokens at another arcade. In essence, this example and line
of reasoning sums up the utility token debate that has
securities lawyers and regulators attempting to reconcile the
line between a true “utility token,” and an investment
contract by another name.97
J. BANKING THE UNBANKED
Another concept I briefly want to touch on is the
potential for digital currencies to help bank the unbanked.
As early as 2015, approximately 93%98 of U.S. households

See Andrew D. Ledbetter & Trenton C. Dykes, SEC eats away at
Munchee “utility tokens”: guidance for ICOs, DLA PIPER (Dec. 14, 2017),
https://www.dlapiper.com/en/us/insights/publications/2017/12/seceats-away-at-munchee-utility-tokens-guidance-for-icos/ (last visited Feb
1, 2018) (noting that “[f]undamentally, the concept is that a token with
‘utility’ should carry an expectation of use, not an expectation of profits,
under the Howey test for investment contracts.”).
98 Remarks by Martin J. Gruenberg, Chairman, Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation to the FDIC 16th Annual Bank Research Conference; Arlington,
97
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had access to banking services. Nevertheless, 2B99 of the
approximately 7.6B100 people on this planet, “do not have a
bank account or access to a financial institution via a mobile
phone, or any other device.”101 Unfortunately for those left
without traditional banking services, the chances of
improving their own socio-economic status, the chances of
their societies seeing significant improvements in living
conditions, and the chances of their societies seeing
significant reductions in poverty, are tremendously low
relative to the banked world. In short, as most of us are
likely aware, “. . . bank accounts have an important part to
play in the founding and expanding of businesses, [in]
making transactions more efficient, secure and transparent[,]
and [in] managing savings.”102 The following map, created
by the Center for Financial Inclusion, displays the percentage
of people by country aged 15 and older who have an account
at a formal financial institution:

VA,
FED.
DEPOSIT
INS.
CORP.
(Sept.
2016),
https://fdic.gov/news/news/speeches/spsep0816.html.
99 Camilla Hodgson, The world's 2 billion unbanked, in 6 charts, BUS.
INSIDER (Aug. 30, 2017), http://www.businessinsider.com/the-worldsunbanked-population-in-6-charts-2017-8 (last visited Jan 7, 2018)
[hereinafter Hodgson].
100
Current
World
Population
Tracker,
WORLDOMETERS,
http://www.worldometers.info/world-population/ (last visited Jan. 9,
2018).
101 Hodgson, supra note 99.
102 Id.
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Many central banks overseeing regions where much
of the population is unbanked, impose restrictive regulations
that make it nearly impossible for businesses to expand and
compete internationally, such as limits on the amount of
foreign currency a citizen can control.104 Furthermore,
without a bank, the cost of remittances105 is tremendously
high. The average immigrant supports more than 12 people
from his or her home country.106 Nevertheless, despite a
willingness to help those at home, those immigrants’

See generally Mapping the Invisible Market, CENTER FOR FINANCIAL
INCLUSION,
http://www.centerforfinancialinclusion.org/fi2020/mapping-theinvisible-market (last visited January 9, 2018).
104 See Paul Vigna & Michael J. Casey, Bitcoin for the Unbanked:
Cryptocurrencies That Go Where Big Banks Won't, FOREIGN AFFAIRS (Oct.
25,
2017),
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/sponsored/bitcoinunbanked.
105 A remittance is a sum of money sent from a foreign worker back to an
individual in his or her own country.
106 Henry O’Mad, Andreas Antonopoulos What Bitcoin Means for Unbanked
Economies,
YOUTUBE
(Jan.
18,
2017),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LLPvEP6BSGE&t=20s (Andreas
Antonopoulos 0:14-1:06).
103
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sending money to unbanked friends or relatives lose more
than 30% of the total funds they transfer: $175B of the
approximately $550B sent through foreign remittances gets
lost each year to fees.107
Bitcoin, other Alt Coins, or other digital currency
projects may help reduce transaction costs, bring greater
financial resources to frontier and emerging markets, and
greater fairness to currency markets, by making banking
more competitive and by opening up a truly global
marketplace.
IV. THE LEGAL CLIMATE OF ICOS
A. PERVASIVE PROBLEMS IN THE ICO MARKET
In broad strokes, the following are the most pressing and
prevalent problems I have observed in the ICO market:
1. PUMP AND DUMP
“One way fraudsters seek to profit is by
engaging in market manipulation, such as by
spreading false and misleading information
about a company (typically microcap stocks) to
affect the stock’s share price. They may spread
stock rumors in different ways, including on
company websites, press releases, email spam,
and posts on social media, online bulletin
boards, and chat rooms. The false or
misleading rumors may be positive or
negative. For
example,
pump-and-dump

107
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schemes often occur on the Internet where it is
common to see messages posted that urge
readers to buy a stock quickly or to sell before
the price goes down, or a promoter will call
using the same sort of pitch. In reality, the
author of the messages may be a company
insider or paid promoter who stands to gain by
selling their shares after the stock price is
‘pumped’ up by the buying frenzy they
create.”108
With more money pouring into Alt Coins with lower
market caps and lesser track records, market manipulation
for fraudsters, promoters, and company insiders has become
substantially easier. When trading in coins of lower market
capitalizations, the influx of capital necessary to manipulate
the price of a coin can be substantially lower than for a coin
of a much higher market capitalization. Consider that as of
the time of this writing, Bitcoin (BTC), the cryptocurrency
with the largest market capitalization, had a market
capitalization of $182,595,352,275, while IOTA (MIOTA), the
tenth
largest,
had
a
market
capitalization
of
$7,421,345,855.61. However, Gnosis (GNO), the onehundredth largest coin by market capitalization, had a
market capitalization of only $218,311,167.60, while Lykke,
the two-hundredth largest coin by market capitalization, had
a market capitalization of less than one-third of that at

Investor Alert: Public Companies Making ICO-Related Claims, U.S, SEC. &
EXCH. COMM’N (2017), https://www.sec.gov/oiea/investor-alerts-andbulletins/ia_icorelatedclaims (last visited Jan. 29, 2018) [hereinafter
Investor Alert].
108
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$69,166,836.70.109 The following demonstrates the pricing
consequences of a $300,000,000 infusion of capital into each
of the aforementioned coins.
17-Jan-18
Bitcoin (BTC)
IOTA (MIOTA)
Gnosis (GNO)
Lykke (LKK)

Coins in
Circulation
16,808,925
2,779,530,283
1,104,590
266,026,295

Price per
Coin (start)
$10,863.30
$2.67
$197.64
$0.26

Price per Coin after
$300M Infusion
$10,880.85
$2.78
$469.23
$1.39

Percentage
Increase
0.16%
4%
137%
434%

Noting that investors struggle to differentiate
between coins, use-cases, and unique projects, and that
returns of 5x, 10x, or more seem rather mundane in this
climate,110 this basic idea has serious consequences.
Typically, a security or asset pumping 50% or 2x overnight
would likely make the security or asset appear somewhat
expensive. At the very least, most would feel like there was a
missed opportunity. In the world of crypto, however, such a
jump has appeared to signal to investors that the stove is
hot, causing those investors flock to the token. Importantly,
while securities generally have some intrinsic value based on
an actual, operating business, many of these newly formed
tokens are used to support platforms that do not yet have
any substantial operations, historical data, or even

Cryptocurrency Market Capitalizations, supra note 4.
E.g., Arjun Kharpal, Ethereum hits a fresh record high and is up over
13,000%
in
a
year,
CNBC
(Jan.
10,
2018),
https://www.cnbc.com/2018/01/10/ethereum-price-hits-record-highabove-1400-up-17000-percent-in-a-year.html (noting that “Steven
Nerayoff, a co-creator of [E]thereum, said it could ‘easily’ double or
triple this year.”); see also Arjun Kharpal, Forget bitcoin, one of its
cryptocurrency rivals is up nearly 5,800 percent this year, CNBC (Dec. 12,
2017),
https://www.cnbc.com/2017/12/12/litecoin-price-hits-recordhigh-up-nearly-5800-percent-this-year.html.
109
110
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sometimes, a stream of revenue, making the issue all the
more concerning.111
2. EXPOSURE OF HIGHLY SENSITIVE INFORMATION
Many of the exchanges require sensitive information
in order to permit higher trading limits. Most higher limit
exchanges require a submission of a passport, often times
forcing investors to send this sensitive information overseas.
Without making any allegations or pointing to a specific
exchange, this appears to be information that is unnecessary
to the transaction, yet could easily be distributed to other
parties relatively anonymously if exchanged for some form
of cryptocurrency, since many of the currencies themselves
are anonymous or pseudo-anonymous.
3. WILDLY SPECULATIVE TOKEN PRICING
Not all tokens are inappropriately valued and not all
ICOs are initiated to take advantage of securities laws or to
rapidly accumulate capital for an idea that otherwise,
through more traditional forms of fundraising, could not
acquire such capital so quickly. Nevertheless, many newly
formed ICOs have sprung up in response to investor
demand, rather than the merit of tokenizing some process.112
In the words of Vitalik Buterin:

Camila Russo & Olga Kharif, The Hottest ICOs Are the Ones That Have
Done the Least Amount of Work, BLOOMBERG TECHNOLOGY (Dec. 11, 2017),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-12-12/want-to-issuea-red-hot-ico-rule-no-1-is-do-very-little-work.
112 See generally Nathan Reiff, Ethereum Founder on ICOs: "We Are in a
Bubble, A Lot of Projects Will Fail,” INVESTOPEDIA (Sept. 12, 2017),
111
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“[i]t would be a mistake to underestimate the
value of ICOs or to say that they are a bad thing.
ICOs are interesting because they enable
monetization for open source projects...what we
are seeing lately is that people are taking this
idea too far, and there are projects that issue a
coin not because it makes sense to issue a coin
but because they have a product they can sell
and [use to] raise money. Without a coin there is
no business model. This creates the imbalance of
incentives in the community at the moment.”113
With investors struggling to differentiate use-cases, and
hoping for lottery-like returns, wildly speculative pricing
has crept into the token space, particularly for newly created
tokens. As Buterin continued,
“I indeed think that we are in a bubble because
all the cryptocurrencies are rising and people
have a feeling that they will always continue to
rise. A lot of projects are raising more money
than what they would be able to in the
normal VC market, and sometimes there is no
match between the necessity and usefulness of
the project and its ability to raise money.
Additionally, this market is still young and
people still don't know how to differentiate

https://www.investopedia.com/news/ethereum-founder-cautions-icobubble-vitalek-buterin/.
113 Id.
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between projects that will exist in the long term
and those that won't.”114
In short, as Buterin and others have noted, many
investors are playing a very risky game by gambling
in a highly inflated space without truly
understanding their investments.
B. THE SEC’S APPROACH
The following paints a picture of the SEC’s approach
in taking jurisdiction over tokens by labeling such tokens as
securities or investment contracts as well as the SEC’s
demeanor towards the token market. In order for a token to
be considered a security or investment contract, the
characteristics of the token must satisfy the Howey test, a
case-by-case factual analysis that identifies an investment
contract as a “transaction or scheme whereby a person
invests his money in a common enterprise and is led to
expect profits solely from the efforts of the promoter or a
third party.”115 For those participating in token sales,
whether as a buyer, seller, promoter, issuer, regulator, or
someone active in discussion, the following references
should help clarify the SEC’s posture with respect to such
sales and the factual context in which a token may be
considered a security or investment contract as opposed to a
pure utility token.

114
115

Id.
Howey, supra note 96 at 299.
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C. THE DAO DEBACLE
“The people who created the DAO saw it as a
decentralized investment fund. Instead of leaving
decisions to a few partners, anyone who invested
would have a say in which companies to fund. The
more you contributed, the more weight your vote
carried. And the distributed structure meant no one
could run off with the money.”116
The DAO was a digital decentralized autonomous
organization in the form of an investor-directed venture
capital fund and served as an experiment in corporate
governance.117 Run on the blockchain, the DAO differed
from traditional investment funds by enforcing formalized
governance rules through smart contracts and allowing all
participants to maintain direct, real-time control over their
money.118 “From April 30, 2016 through May 28, 2016, the
DAO offered and sold approximately 1.15 billion DAO
Tokens in exchange for approximately 12 million Ether
(“ETH”). At the time the offering closed, the ETH raised by
the DAO equated to approximately $150 million.119 Given
that the DAO was run on the Ethereum blockchain, ETH

Klint Finley, A $50 Million Hack Just Showed that the DAO was All too
Human,
WIRED
(June
18,
2016,
4:30
AM),
https://www.wired.com/2016/06/50-million-hack-just-showed-daohuman/.
117 See Report of Investigation Pursuant to 21(a) of the Sec. & Exch. Act of
1934: The DAO, Sec. Exch. Act of 1934 Release No. 81207 (July 25, 2017),
https://www.sec.gov/litigation/investreport/34-81207.pdf [hereinafter
Investigation Report].
118 Id.
119 Id.
116
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was needed as fuel to run the company, thus the company
soliciting ETH.120 In exchange for ETH, the DAO’s code
created tokens. The tokens granted their holders voting
rights and were distributed in proportion to each member’s
sum of ETH contributed.121 Ergo, the more tokens a member
held, the more weight his or her vote carried. Importantly,
for this discussion, as the SEC report notes, the founders of
the DAO likened this process to “buying shares in a
company . . . . ”122
Under the rules of The DAO, in order for a project to
be considered for funding, the project “contractor”123 first
had to submit a proposal to The DAO entity by: 1) writing a
smart contract and deploying and publishing it on the
Ethereum blockchain; and 2) posting details about the
proposal on the DAO website. The project would then be
reviewed by the DAO “Curators,” who served as a filter for
DAO considered projects, deciding which proposals would
get put up for vote124. If a majority vote of the token holders
supported a selected project, then the ETH raised by the
DAO would be contributed to fund the project, with DAO
investors hoping to make a return on their investment.125“In
late May 2016, just prior to the expiration of the Offering
Period, concerns about the safety and security of The DAO’s
funds began to surface due to vulnerabilities in The DAO’s
code.”126 The concerns proved valid, as an attacker
effectively stole 3.6M ETH from the DAO entity.

Id.
Id.
122 Id.
123 Id.
124 Id.
125 Id.
126 Id.
120
121
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Section 21(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
authorizes the Commission to investigate violations of the
federal securities laws and, in its discretion, to “publish
information concerning any such violations.”127 In July of
2017, the SEC used its powers under Section 21(a) and issued
a report of investigation into the DAO.128 In the DAO
Report, the SEC analyzed tokens issued by the DAO by the
“facts and circumstances” test established by the Supreme
Court in Howey.129 Pursuant to this test, the SEC analyzed
whether: (1) purchasers of the ICO invested money or
valuable goods or services; (2) purchasers of the ICO were
investing in a common enterprise; (3) purchasers of the ICO
had a reasonable expectation of earning profits; and (4) any
profits earned from the ICO were to be derived from the
efforts of others. Using this test, the SEC determined that the
elements of the Howey test were met because: (1) the
purchasers’ payments in ETH were an investment of money;
(2) the ETH was invested in a common enterprise; (3)
investors had a reasonable expectation of profit; and (4)
investors relied on the efforts of others because of the key
role played by the founders and “Curators” of the DAO.130
Significantly, in the Report, the SEC stressed that not
all ICOs would be considered securities, and emphasized
that the analysis would continue to remain highly
contingent upon the facts of a particular token offering,
which were to be analyzed under Howey.131

Id. at Footnote 2.
Id.
129 Howey, supra note 96.
130 Investigation Report, supra note 117.
131 Id.
127
128
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D. SEC SUSPENDS TRADING IN THREE PUBLIC COMPANIES
LIKELY TO ENGAGE IN AN ICO
Pursuant to Section 12(k) of the Securities Act of 1934,
the SEC temporarily suspended trading in the securities of
First Bitcoin Capital Corp., CIAO Group, Strategic Global,
and Sunshine Capital, 132 three public companies that had
indicated they were likely to engage in an ICO.133 As noted in
SEC Release No. 81474, the Commission “temporarily
suspended trading in the securities of BITCF because of
concerns regarding the accuracy and adequacy of publicly
available information about the company including, among
other things, the value of BITCF’s assets and its capital
structure.”134 Following the enforcement actions, the SEC
issued an “Investor Alert” on August 28, 2017, indicating, in
part,“[c]ircumstances that might lead to a trading
suspension,” which included:
A lack of current, accurate, or adequate
information about the company – for example,
when a company has not filed any periodic
reports for an extended period;
• Questions about the accuracy of publicly
available information, including in company
press releases and reports, about the
company’s current operational status and
financial condition; or
•

Gatti, Gordon & Silver, supra note 93.
Id.
134 SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N Release No. 81474 (Aug. 23, 2017),
https://www.sec.gov/litigation/suspensions/2017/34-81474.pdf.
132
133
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Questions about trading in the stock, including
trading by insiders, potential market
manipulation, and the ability to clear and settle
transactions in the stock.135

In the Investor Alert, the SEC focused on warning investors
about pump and dump schemes and market manipulations
and showed a willingness to suspend trading in securities of
publicly traded companies who merely appear likely to raise
additional capital through an ICO.
E. SEC INTRODUCES CYBER UNIT AND RETAIL STRATEGY
INITIATIVES AND TAKES ENFORCEMENT ACTION AGAINST
AN ICO

1. SEC CYBER UNIT AND RETAIL STRATEGY INITIATIVES
INTRODUCED

On September 25, 2017, the SEC announced two new
initiatives to build upon the Enforcement Division’s efforts
to battle cyber-based threats and protect retail investors:
“[t]he creation of a Cyber Unit . . . focus[ed] on targeting
cyber-related misconduct and the establishment of a retail
strategy task force . . . [to] implement initiatives that directly
affect retail investors reflect[ing] SEC Chairman Jay
Clayton’s priorities in these important areas.”136

Investor Alert, supra note 108.
SEC Announces Enforcement Initiatives to Combat Cyber-Based Threats
and Protect Retail Investors, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N (2017),
https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2017-176 (last visited Jan 29,
2018).
135
136
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According to a press release on the SEC website, the
Cyber Unit will target cyber-related misconduct including:
1) market manipulation schemes involving false information
spread through electronic and social media; 2) hacking to
obtain material nonpublic information; 3) violations
involving distributed ledger technology and initial coin
offerings; 4) misconduct perpetrated using the dark web; 5)
intrusions into retail brokerage accounts; and 6) cyberrelated threats to trading platforms and other critical market
infrastructure.137
Describing the prevalence and risk of cyber-related
misconduct, Stephanie Avakian, Co-Director of the SEC’s
Enforcement Division, stated ‘[c]yber-related threats and
misconduct are among the greatest risks facing investors and
the securities industry . . . . ’138 These comments and actions
appear to indicate that the SEC intends to be substantially
more aware of and aggressive with those people and
companies involved in the token market.
1. SPEED AND THE PRESUMPTION THAT A TOKEN IS A
SECURITY

On September 29, 2017, The Securities and Exchange
Commission charged Maksim Zaslavskiy and two
companies (REcoin Group Foundation, LLC and DRC
World, Inc.) with defrauding investors in a pair of initial
coin offerings purportedly backed by investments in real
estate and diamonds.139 With respect to REcoin, Zaslavskiy

Id.
Id.
139 See generally U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. REcoin Group Found., LLC,
No. 1:17-cv-05725, 2017 BL, (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 2017).
137
138
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touted the venture as “The First Ever Cryptocurrency
Backed by Real Estate.”140 The complaint alleges, in part,
that:
“The stated purpose of each ICO was to
convert ‘fiat currency,’ or ‘digital currency’
obtained using fiat currency, into ‘tokenized’
currency that would be backed by investments
in certain assets (real estate in the case of
REcoin and diamonds in the case of Diamond)
that would generate returns for investors
stemming from: (i) the appreciation in value of
the investments Defendants would make, in
the case of REcoin, in real estate assets, or, in
the case of Diamond, in diamonds; (ii) the
appreciation in value of the REcoin and
Diamond tokens as the Companies’ businesses
grew due to the managerial efforts of teams of
‘experts;’ and (iii) the supposed increase in
demand for the tokens.”141
Notably, the complaint alleges that Zaslavskiy fraudulently
raised $300,000 from “hundreds of investors, through
various material misrepresentations and deceptive acts . . .
.”142 Specifically, in this regard, the complaint alleges that
investors were induced into purchasing coins (of which,
allegedly, there were none), that REcoin claimed to “’ha[ve]

SEC Exposes Two Initial Coin Offerings Purportedly Backed by Real Estate
and Diamonds, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N (Sept. 29, 2017),
https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2017-185-0.
141 U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. REcoin Group Found., LLC. No. 1:17-cv05725, 2017 BL, (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 2017) (Comp. ¶ 4.).
142 Id.
140
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a team of lawyers, professionals, brokers, and accountants
that would invest REcoin’s ICO proceeds into real estate and
that Diamond had ‘experts’ to select the best diamonds”
(although allegedly, none of the aforementioned
professionals or experts had been hired), and that investors
in the REcoin ICO could expect to make profits from
REcoin’s real estate investments and 10-15% returns from
Diamond’s operations (though neither had any real
operations).143
Unfortunately, the Zaslavskiy action appears
shrouded in so many bad facts that it is unlikely to bring
significant clarity to the regulatory framework of ICOs.
Nevertheless, [t]he Zaslavskiy enforcement action, which
targeted what is in essence a fraud scheme, is notable for
[several] reasons:
“1.
Speed. Zaslavskiy only started soliciting
investments in REcoin in July 2017; the SEC
began its investigation in August 2017.
2. Securities Presumption. It appears that
the SEC will classify ICO tokens as securities
unless the tokens are proven otherwise, in
essence shifting the burden to operators of
ICOs to show that the tokens being offered are
not securities.”144

143
144

Id.
Gatti, Gordon & Silver, supra note 93.
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2. SEC WARNS CELEBRITIES AND PROMOTERS
In November, the SEC warned against
celebrity and promoter endorsements,145 stating:
“Any celebrity or other individual who
promotes a virtual token or coin that is a
security must disclose the nature, scope, and
amount of compensation received in exchange
for the promotion. A failure to disclose this
information is a violation of the anti-touting
provisions
of
the
federal
securities
laws. Persons making these endorsements may
also be liable for potential violations of the
anti-fraud provisions of the federal securities
laws, for participating in an unregistered offer
and sale of securities, and for acting as
unregistered brokers.”146
Importantly, and in conjunction other SEC
interpretation read broadly, this statement appears to extend
to those who carry significant social clout or influence,
including through an internet presence, such as a YouTube
channel or podcast, for example.

Notably, class action litigation is currently pending in the Southern
District of Florida against a Centra Tech, Inc. offering promoted by Floyd
Mayweather. Rensel v. Centra Tech, Inc., Docket No. 1:17-cv-24500 (S.D.
Fla. Dec. 13, 2017).
146 Statement on Potentially Unlawful Promotion of Initial Coin Offerings and
Other Investments by Celebrities and Others, U.S, SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N
(2017),
https://www.sec.gov/news/public-statement/statementpotentially-unlawful-promotion-icos (last visited Jan. 29, 2018).
145
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F. MUNCHEE ACTION PROVIDES THE BASELINE FOR THE
UTILITY TOKEN DEBATE

Munchee, Inc. (“Munchee”) sought to “disrupt review
sites such as Yelp, FourSquare, Google Places, and Zagat, by
introducing an immutable and verifiable blockchain-based
user review process that [was] based around a crypto-token
to incentivize ecosystem participants.”147 Marketed as the
“Instagram for food,” Munchee planned on issuing a finite
supply of 500,000,000 MUN, (tokens used to pay for goods
and services on the Munchee platform or to reward content
creators).148 “In October and November of 2017, Munchee
conducted an offering of “MUN tokens to raise about $15
million in capital so that it could improve its existing app
and recruit users to eventually buy advertisements, write
reviews, sell food, and conduct other transactions using
MUN.” Purchasers of MUN tokens in the earlier stages of
the offering were offered “discounts of 15% and 10% on the
offering price.” 149 Notably, “while Munchee told potential
purchasers that they would be able to use MUN tokens to
buy goods or services in the future after Munchee created an
‘ecosystem,’ no one was able to buy any good or service with

Richard Kastelein, Munchee Announces The First Decentralized Food
Review And Social Platform, BLOCKCHAINNEWS (Sept. 27, 2017),
http://www.the-blockchain.com/2017/09/27/munchee-announcesfirst-decentralized-food-review-social-platform/.
148 Dr. Sanjeev Verma, Nghi Bui and Chelsea Lam, Munchee Token: A
decentralized Blockchain based food review/rating social media platform, (Oct.
16,
2017),
https://s3.amazonaws.com/muncheedocs/Munchee+White+Paper.pdf.
149 Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 Release No. 10445 (Dec. 11, 2017),
https://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2017/33-10445.pdf [hereinafter
Release No. 10445].
147
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MUN throughout the relevant period.”150 Moreover,
Munchee also expressly stated that it intended and would
ensure that MUN tokens would trade in secondary markets
on a number of exchanges in various jurisdictions.151
On December 11, 2017, pursuant to Section 8A of the
Securities Act of 1933, the SEC initiated cease-and-desist
proceedings against Munchee Inc., to prevent Munchee from
“committing or causing any violations and any future
violations of Section 5(a) and (c) of the Securities Act.”152 The
SEC noted that the MUN tokens were securities, in part,
because MUN purchasers had a “reasonable expectation of
obtaining a future profit.”153 To this point, the SEC noted
several specific examples to support its conclusion. One such
example was a Munchee Facebook post created on or about
October 25, 2017, which “linked to a third-party YouTube
video, and wrote ‘199% GAINS on MUN token at ICO price!
Sign up for PRE-SALE NOW!’”154 Moreover, the SEC
commented that “Munchee and its agents targeted the
marketing of the MUN tokens offering to people with an
interest in tokens or other digital assets that have in recent
years created profits for early investors in ICOs.”155
The SEC also pointed to several specific examples to
support its conclusion that MUN token purchasers
reasonably expected to profit solely or primarily from the
efforts of Munchee and its agents.156 First, the SEC noted “in
the MUN White Paper and elsewhere, Munchee highlighted

Id.
Id.
152 Id.
153 Id.
154 Id.
155 Id.
156 Id.
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that its founders had worked at prominent technology
companies and highlighted their skills running businesses
and creating software.”157 Somewhat more interestingly,
however, was the SEC’s notice of a specific example of a
person who posted a YouTube video that described and
endorsed the MUN token offering.158 This person’s YouTube
channel had approximately 15,000 followers159 and, in the
video review, the person discussed how MUN token
purchasers would profit only after Munchee did years of
work . . . .”160 Strangely, the SEC did not assert that this
person was affiliated with Munchee or why this person’s
opinion was representative of what a MUN token purchaser
reasonably expected.161
That said, the most significant portion of this
somewhat puzzling SEC order was paragraph 35, which
stated:
“Even if MUN tokens had a practical use at the
time of the offering, it would not preclude the
token from being a security. Determining
whether a transaction involves a security does
not turn on labelling – such as characterizing
an ICO as involving a ‘utility token’ – but
instead requires an assessment of ‘the
economic realities underlying a transaction.’
Forman, 421 U.S. at 849. All of the relevant

Id.
Id.
159 In comparison to other YouTube channels, the 15,000 subscribers
appear relatively non-influential, given that many YouTube channels
have millions of subscribers.
160 Release No. 10445, supra note 149.
161 Id.
157
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facts and circumstances are considered in
making that determination. See Forman, 421
U.S. at 849 (purchases of ‘stock’ solely for
purpose of obtaining housing not purchase of
‘investment contract’); see also SEC v. C.M.
Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344, 352-53
(1943) (indicating the ‘test . . . is what character
the instrument is given in commerce by the
terms of the offer, the plan of distribution, and
the economic inducements held out to the
prospect’).”162
Although the line remains unclear, according to this
comment, merely having actual utility does not preclude a
token from being deemed a security. While in this case there
was no actual utility for the token, and while on the other
end of the spectrum exists our Dave & Busters credits, or
Starbucks gift cards, it will be interesting to see how much
more aggressive the SEC becomes in taking jurisdiction over
tokens with real, practical utility, and more so, where on the
spectrum of utility those tokens fall. Given the SEC’s
reference to the language “economic realities underlying a
transaction” and to SEC v. C.M. Joiner,163 it will also be
intriguing to see the degree of precaution token issuers must
take given the frenzied climate of exchange in secondary
markets.

162
163

Id.
See S.E.C. v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344 (1943).
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G. WILL MORE STRINGENT U.S. REGULATION REALLY AFFORD
MORE PROTECTION TO U.S. INVESTORS?
At the beginning of this note, I mentioned that many
U.S. ICOs appear to be structured under Rule 506, as this
seems to be the most logical niche within the securities
framework for this method of raising capital. In the earlier
example, I discussed Filecoin, an offering that was effected
via a Simple Agreement for Future Tokens (SAFT) and
accompanying offering memorandum,164 which limited the
offering to accredited investors, prohibited resales before the
expiration of the appropriate holding period, and detailed a
lengthy list of risk factors associated with investing in the
Filecoin project and blockchain technologies generally.165 As
mentioned, these protections in particular appeared
meaningful in combatting some of the more prevalent issues
and dangers present in today’s ICO and secondary markets.
Now that there is a baseline of understanding, I can expand
upon this prior thought in greater detail and highlight a
potential problem with squeezing more ICOs into the
existing regulatory framework.
At first glance, Rule 506 seems to eliminate many of
the concerns surrounding the ICO and secondary markets
(particularly when noting that even exempt securities are
subject to the securities laws anti-fraud provisions, including
Rule 10b),166 without putting too much strain on raising
capital because Rule 506 allows a company to raise up to an
unlimited dollar amount. First, Rule 506 requires that in
order for general solicitation or advertising to be permitted,

Protocol Labs, Inc., supra note 43.
Id.
166 See 17 CFR 240.10b.
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an issuer must “take reasonable steps to verify that
purchasers of the securities are accredited investors using
such methods as determined by the Commission.”167 To that
point, the SEC has stated that issuers should consider the
following factors to meet the reasonable verification
requirement under Rule 506(c):
• the nature of the purchaser and the type of
accredited investor that the purchaser claims to
be;
• the amount and type of information that the
issuer has about the purchaser; and
• the nature of the offering, such as the
manner in which the purchaser was solicited to
participate in the offering, and the terms of the
offering, such as a minimum investment
amount.168
By limiting the offerings to accredited investors, the
Rule inherently imposes a greater degree of investor
protection. The law surrounding Regulation D rebuttably
presumes that accredited investors are sophisticated and can
“fend for themselves.”169 At the very least, accredited
investors have relatively more wealth than non-accredited
investors, and therefore the opportunity to diversify their

See 17 CFR 230.506.
Eliminating the Prohibition Against General Solicitation and General
Advertising in Rule 506 and Rule 144A Offerings, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N
(Dec.
11,
2011),
https://www.sec.gov/news/publicstatement/statement-potentially-unlawful-promotion-icos [hereinafter
Eliminating the Prohibition].
169 See SEC v. Ralston Purina, 346 U.S. 119 (1953).
167
168
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portfolios in a manner sufficient to mitigate associated risks
or to hire someone to do so and perform due diligence on
their behalf. Moreover, accredited investors, particularly
when pooled together, have greater resources to exact
information (and for this reason, Regulation D generally
assumes that accredited investors have the type of
information that would necessarily be found in a registration
statement).170 Additionally, the third bullet listed above,
“nature of the offering,” appears to give the SEC sufficient
precedent to treat ICOs differently, should the SEC feel that
ICOs require unique treatment given their inherent
characteristics (e.g., that capital is being raised, often times,
through the exchange of pseudo-anonymous currency).171
Moreover, “using such methods as determined by the
Commission” also appears to provide room for the SEC to
create a more precise and unique framework for Initial Coin
Offerings.172
However, maybe most importantly, securities issued
under Regulation D are “restricted securities.”173 Before
someone may sell any restricted security in the marketplace,
he or she must hold that security for a certain period of
time.174 Furthermore, to specifically comply with Rule 506,

See generally Report on the Review of the Definition of “Accredited
Investor,” U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (2015),
https://www.sec.gov/files/review-definition-of-accredited-investor-1218-2015.pdf.
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(2017),
https://medium.com/cybertrustbank/crypto-and-anonymityc35c2053ae7a (last visited Feb. 2, 2018).
172 Eliminating the Prohibition, supra note 168.
173 Rule 144: Selling Restricted and Control Securities, U.S. SEC. & EXCH.
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the issuer must take certain actions to guard against resales,
such as obtaining purchaser investment letters that commit
to the restrictions.175 Currently, the most pervasive problem
in the ICO market can be summed up as the combination of
the fear of missing out (“FOMO”), the pressure to act
quickly, and the lack of clear regulation that has thus far
placed lesser scrutiny on how offerings are marketed and,
most importantly, the disclosures that some offerings
provide (after all, the thrust of the securities laws is
disclosure). This combination, in conjunction with wildly
volatile pricing and exuberant demand, has led those on
secondary exchanges to purchase first and ask questions
later; unfortunately, once later comes around, investors are
also likely left with less robust information to sift through
than would likely be available in more traditional securities
markets. Hence, some investors have been incentivized to
participate in the ICO market not for the merit of the
investment or some intrinsic value, but merely for what I
dub the “hype premium” or the amount a token can be
immediately sold for on the secondary market purely based
on rumors, excitement, speculation, and, in some cases,
pumping. Rule 502176 asserts:
“Securities acquired in a transaction under
Regulation D shall have the status of securities
acquired in a transaction under section 4(a)(2)
of the Act and cannot be resold without
registration under the Act or an exemption
therefrom. The issuer shall exercise reasonable
care to assure that the purchasers of the

175
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securities are not underwriters within the
meaning of section 2(a)(11) of the Act, which
reasonable care may be demonstrated by the
following:
(1) Reasonable inquiry to determine if the
purchaser is acquiring the securities for himself
or for other persons;
(2) Written disclosure to each purchaser prior
to sale that the securities have not been
registered under the Act and, therefore, cannot
be resold unless they are registered under
the Act or unless an exemption from
registration is available; and
(3) Placement of a legend on the certificate or
other document that evidences the securities
stating that the securities have not been
registered under the Act and setting forth or
referring to the restrictions on transferability
and sale of the securities.”177
Section 2(a)(11) of the Exchange Act of 1933 defines an
underwriter broadly as “any person who has purchased
from an issuer with a view to . . .” distribute any security.178
Under SEC “safe harbor” Rule 144, “a minimum of one year
must elapse between the later of the date of the acquisition
of the securities from the issuer, or from an affiliate of
the issuer . . . ” before resale.179 Having such resale
restrictions would allow for a cool down period and provide
for greater time for due diligence.

See Rule 17 CFR 230.502.
Sec. & Exch. Act § 2(a)(11).
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That mentioned, when considering imposing greater
regulatory scrutiny on ICOs, we must also consider the
potential unintended consequences that squeezing more
token sales into the securities framework may have on the
U.S. ICO market and U.S. investors generally. While Rule
506 places no restrictions on the total amount of capital a
company may raise,180 capital may stop flowing into U.S.
based ICOs and instead from U.S. investors to companies in
other countries with less robust securities frameworks as
investors, in the short-run, continue to pursue the hype
premium (in the long-run, I expect normalization).
Consequently, this process may push the needle in a
direction that opens the door for more accredited, and more
relevantly, non-accredited investors to send money overseas,
thereby affording such persons less protection, rather than
more protection.
Noting this difficult reality, the regulatory regimes in
other countries should be at the forefront of discussion when
considering how to handle ICOs and the secondary markets
domestically. For comparison, the following briefly
summarizes the approaches taken by the four largest
countries by GDP (other than the U.S.), Israel, Dubai and
Switzerland (given their prominence in financial world), and
South Korea (given its prominence in the world of tokens):
CHINA: Beijing banned the sale of cryptocurrencies and tokens outright in September
[of 2017], saying in a statement ICOs have
disrupted the economic and financial order.
Any individuals or organizations that have
completed fund-raising through a coin offering

180

See 17 CFR 230.506.
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should make arrangements to return the funds,
and ensure that the legitimate rights and
interests of the investors are protected.181
JAPAN: Japan’s Financial Services Agency . . .
issued a warning in late October about the
risks of investing in ICOs. Although Japan has
no specific laws on ICOs, they may be
regulated by two existing laws: the Payment
Services Act and the Financial Instruments and
Exchange Act.182
GERMANY: Germany has no specific
regulations for ICOs, but expect ICOs to
adhere to existing regulations including those
encapsulated in the Banking Act, Investment
Act, Securities Trading Act, Payment Services
Supervision Act, and Prospectus Act.
However, the Federal Financial Supervisory
Authority has issued a warning regarding the
risks of ICO investments. Per the statement,
“Due to the lack of legal requirements and
transparency rules, consumers are left on their
own when it comes to verifying the identity,
reputability, and credit standing of the token
provider and understanding and assessing the
investment on offer. It can also not be

Gertrude Chavez-Dreyfuss, Angela Moon & Tomasz Janowski,
Factbox: National regulators' views on initial coin offerings, REUTERS (Nov.
28, 2017), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-blockchain-regulationtokens-factbox/factbox-national-regulators-views-on-initial-coinofferings-idUSKBN1DS0FW [hereinafter Chavez-Dreyfuss et al.].
182 Id.
181

2017 TRADING CRYPTOCURRENCIES WHILE STUDYING LAW

223

guaranteed that personal data will be protected
in accordance with German standards.”183
UNITED KINGDOM: The Financial Conduct
Authority warned in September that coins
issued in public offering were subject to
extreme volatility, often carried little or no
investor protection, and were high-risk given
their unregulated nature and early stage of
many projects. It is now considering whether
to introduce specific regulations on digital coin
sales.184
ISRAEL: The Israel Securities Authority (ISA)
has announced a plan to form a panel to
regulate initial coin offerings and consider to
what extent securities regulations would apply
to coin sales.185
DUBAI: The Dubai Financial Services
Authority has issued a warning on ICOs in
September, but in an emailed response to
Reuters it said it needed to review the types of
ICOs and their potential impact on investors
and markets, before formulating its views on
any need for action.186
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SWITZERLAND: While its Financial Market
Supervisory Authority does not have rules
designed specifically for ICOs, some parts of
the procedure may be covered by existing
regulations depending on how such an
offering is structured, the regulator has said.
The authority said in September that it had
started to investigate a number of ICOs for
possible breaches of Swiss law.187
SOUTH KOREA: The nation’s financial
regulator in September prohibited domestic
companies and startups from participating in
ICOs and said that those involved would face
‘stern penalties.’188
V. CONCLUSION
Blockchain technology and cryptocurrencies have the
potential to reshape many trust-based systems, creating a
more global economy, and engendering a more efficient
economy for maximizing the potential of leveraging certain
internet connected assets. However, “[u]nlike the Internet,
which has a sophisticated governance ecosystem, the whole
world of blockchain and digital currencies is the Wild West.”189
As such, and to bring this note full circle, “[a] number of
concerns have been raised regarding the cryptocurrency and
ICO markets, including that, as they are currently operating,
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there is substantially less investor protection than in our
traditional securities markets, with correspondingly greater
opportunities for fraud and manipulation[.]”190
Unfortunately, in the short-term, I believe many, if
not most, people will devote more resources to taking
advantage of the economic and regulatory climate than
promoting truly disruptive use-cases of blockchain and
cryptocurrencies. Ultimately, as noted by Buffet, this
perspective and approach may lead to “ . . . a bad ending”191
for many speculative investors, and, for this reason, I expect
cryptocurrencies and ICOs to be a tremendously hot and
fluid legal topic throughout 2018 and beyond. While much
of this note focused on the SEC’s approach, and touched on
some cases in the U.S. court system, cryptocurrency and
ICOs are truly a global phenomenon. When considering
these topics, I urge those in the legal community,
domestically and abroad, to approach these innovations
with an open-mind, and to really attempt to understand, in
order to help promote truly informed policy decisions as
opposed to those made in response to poor or irrational
investment decisions.
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